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PAUL A. DILLER∗ 
The Partly Fulfilled Promise 
of Home Rule in Oregon 
 
n 1906, Oregon voters approved the “Home Rule Amendment” to 
the Oregon Constitution.1  Enshrined in article XI, section 2, the 
amendment allows cities to claim extensive lawmaking authority 
through their municipal charters.2  Unlike many other states’ home-
rule provisions, article XI, section 2 has proved remarkably durable.3  
Deft judicial interpretations of its broad, general language have 
facilitated a run of 103 years and counting.  During this time, 
Oregon’s cities have enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy over social 
and economic policy.  But in recent years the legislature and the 
voters—through initiative—have undercut that autonomy in important 
ways.  In part due to a propensity for subject-specific preemption, 
 
∗ I thank Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Jeff Dobbins, Jennifer Evert, and Justice Hans 
Linde for helpful advice on earlier drafts.  I also thank Justice Thomas Balmer and Chin 
See Ming for useful comments at the symposium.  Adam Hollar provided stellar research 
assistance on this project. 
1 City of Portland v. Jackson, 316 Or. 143, 151, 850 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1993).  
Interestingly, “home rule” as such is not mentioned in article XI, section 2.  See City of La 
Grande v. Pub. Employes [sic] Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 140 n.2, 576 P.2d 1204, 1201 n.2 
(1978), aff’d on reh’g, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978).  Although “home rule” is 
susceptible to many definitions, id., I use it to mean the state’s delegation to cities of the 
power to engage in substantive policymaking.  See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007). 
2 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 140, 576 P.2d at 1207.  After fifty-two years of 
municipal home rule, in 1958, Oregon voters extended the privilege of home rule to 
counties, enacting by referendum article VI, section 10.  Since then, nine counties have 
availed themselves of the opportunity to exercise home-rule powers.  See Oregon State 
Archives, Oregon Historical County Records Guide: County Government Development, 
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/archives/county/cpctygov.html (last visited May 6, 
2009). 
3 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 160–61, 576 P.2d at 1217 (Tongue, J., dissenting). 
I 
 940 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 939 
Oregon’s cities and counties have not led the nation in enacting 
trendsetting municipal policy. 
This Article discusses some of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Oregon’s home-rule system.  It posits that a particular advantage of 
Oregon’s home-rule system is its unique “reverse assumptions” of 
validity for local civil and criminal enactments.4  Oregon courts have 
consistently read the Home Rule Amendment as establishing a strong 
presumption that civil ordinances are valid and not impliedly 
preempted by state law.  Although this strong presumption does not 
protect cities from express preemption by state law, it otherwise 
ensures that cities have broad authority with respect to policies they 
seek to enforce through civil means.  Conversely, in the criminal 
realm Oregon courts have reversed the assumption of validity, reading 
article XI, section 2 as establishing a rebuttable presumption that state 
law preempts local ordinances.5  Although the Oregon courts have 
unevenly applied this presumption against local criminal authority, as 
an abstract proposition, the presumption wisely discourages a 
statewide patchwork of criminal law.  A franker and fuller judicial 
recognition of the functional value served by the Home Rule 
Amendment’s presumption against local criminal lawmaking would 
help clarify the confused jurisprudence in this area. 
While Oregon’s article XI, section 2—and its “reverse 
assumptions” jurisprudence, in particular—establish a sound 
structural framework for the vertical distribution of power between 
the state and its cities, it is a framework that can be altered by state 
legislators and voters.  In its seminal opinion in 1978, City of La 
Grande v. Public Employes [sic] Retirement Board,6 the Oregon 
Supreme Court made clear that the Home Rule Amendment does not 
protect cities from statewide preemption on matters of substantive 
policy.  In recent years, the state legislature has with some frequency 
exercised its power to preempt local regulatory authority on 
significant matters of public policy, often at the behest of well-funded 
interest groups.  The state legislature’s propensity to preempt has 
stunted the ability of Oregon’s cities and counties to serve as “proving 
 
4 City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or. 490, 501, 714 P. 220, 227 (1986). 
5 The reverse “assumptions” operate like legal presumptions.  See, e.g., Denton Plastics 
v. City of Portland, 105 Or. App. 302, 306, 804 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1991).  I therefore use 
“assumption” and “presumption” interchangeably throughout this Article when describing 
Oregon’s home-rule system. 
6 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204. 
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grounds” for new social and economic policies.7  In addition, a 
succession of voter-approved state constitutional amendments has 
limited the fiscal autonomy of local governments, and a handful of 
referenda have preempted city authority on important matters of 
substantive policy.  The upshot is a “Swiss cheese” of home rule, with 
certain large holes of regulatory and fiscal authority carved out by 
state law.  This “Swiss cheese” regime has stunted local policy 
experimentation to some degree, and may be partly responsible for 
the somewhat tepid exercise of municipal regulatory authority by 
Oregon cities, as compared to other cities nationwide. 
Part I of this Article assesses the background constitutional 
principles from which Oregon’s Home Rule Amendment emerged 
and discusses the history and text of the provision.  Part II assesses 
the “reverse assumptions” doctrine that flows from the amendment.  It 
argues that the doctrine is functionally sound, but that the 
jurisprudence on the criminal side needs clarification.  Part II suggests 
clarifying the jurisprudence by recognizing the functional values 
served by the presumption against local criminal lawmaking 
authority.  Part III then explores the ways in which legislative and 
voter-approved preemption have undercut cities’ broader local 
autonomy on the civil side.  Part III takes count of a series of 
constitutional amendments that have limited the fiscal authority of 
local governments and offers potential demographic and political 
explanations for why Oregon cities are rarely trendsetters in 
municipal policymaking. 
I 
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF OREGON’S HOME RULE 
AMENDMENT 
The federal Constitution does not formally recognize local 
governments, nor does it bestow any political power upon them.8  
Although cities, townships, boroughs, and counties have existed in 
 
7 Sims v. Besaw’s Café, 165 Or. App. 180, 200 n.3, 997 P.2d 201, 213 n.3 (2000) 
(Linder, J., concurring). 
8 But see David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local 
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); David J. Barron, The Promise of 
Tribe’s City: Self-Government, The Constitution, and a New Urban Age, 42 TULSA L. 
REV. 811, 812 (2007); Richard C. Schragger, Cities As Constitutional Actors: The Case of 
Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147 (2005) (arguing for recognition of “local 
constitutionalism”). 
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America since well before independence from Great Britain,9 the 
prevailing constitutional view has been that cities and counties are 
mere “convenient agencies” that the state legislature may abolish or 
reorganize at any time for almost any reason.10  This view, promoted 
by John F. Dillon, a prominent Iowa Supreme Court (and later federal 
circuit) judge, in his seminal treatise on municipal law in the late 
1800s,11 was wholeheartedly embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
its 1907 decision of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,12 and remains a 
fundamental principle of federal constitutional law.13 
In addition to the principle of state supremacy embraced by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Hunter, a related legal doctrine, also promoted 
by Judge Dillon, gained wide acceptance in American law in the late 
1800s.  This principle, known as Dillon’s Rule, posits that cities have 
no inherent powers and possess only those powers specifically 
delegated to them by state law.14  As a corollary, Dillon’s Rule 
requires that courts, when interpreting a delegation from state to city, 
resolve against the city any doubt regarding whether it possesses a 
particular power.15  From this background of municipal weakness,16 
 
9 Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1095–99 
(1980).  In his mid-nineteenth century observations on American life, Alexis de 
Tocqueville famously extolled the virtues and importance of township governments, 
particularly in New England.  See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
181 (Henry Reeve trans., 1961). 
10 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907). 
11 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 9b, at 93 (2d ed. 
1873). 
12 207 U.S. at 178–79. 
13 See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1100 (2009) (referring to local 
governments as “subordinate governmental instrumentalities” from which the state may 
“withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit”) (internal citations omitted); Holt Civic 
Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (citing Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178).  But see 
Ysursa, 129 S. Ct. at 1107 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “[r]elationships between 
state and local governments are more varied . . . than the majority’s analysis admits”); 
Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City, supra note 8, at 560–95 (discerning “traces” of 
federal constitutional protection for local government decisionmaking in Supreme Court 
case law, despite formal doctrine to the contrary). 
14 DILLON, supra note 11, at 93 (“[Municipalities] possess no powers or faculties not 
conferred upon them, either expressly or by fair implication, by the law which creates 
them . . . .”). 
15 Id. § 55, at 173. 
16 See Eberth v. County of Prince William, 637 S.E.2d 338, 342 (Va. App. 2006).  In 
theory, Dillon’s Rule need not result in city powerlessness, for the state legislature could 
grant broad powers─perhaps even the “police power” in toto─to a city or cities throughout 
the state.  In practice, however, before the home-rule movement began in earnest, few state 
legislatures’ grants of power were so broad, and cities frequently found their attempts to 
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the first movement for home rule emerged in the late 1800s and early 
1900s.  In an effort to provide cities with some degree of organic 
policymaking authority,17 five states—California, Colorado, 
Minnesota, Missouri, and Washington—added home-rule provisions 
to their constitutions by 1906.18  These early provisions, unlike their 
more modern counterparts, empowered cities to adopt their own 
charters, which, in turn, would define the limits of municipal power.19 
Oregon passed article XI, section 2 in 1906, toward the end of this 
first wave of home-rule reform.  Interestingly, unlike similar 
provisions adopted in other states, Oregon’s Home Rule Amendment 
was not primarily aimed at altering Dillon’s Rule’s constricted view 
of local authority, for it is not clear that Oregon courts had fully 
embraced the rule by 1906.  While some pre-1906 decisions cited 
Dillon in restricting local power,20 others took a rather expansive 
view of municipal authority, despite the absence of a home-rule 
provision in the state constitution.21  Instead, the specific “evil” 
toward which the Home Rule Amendment appears to have been 
directed was the need for special legislative enactment of new or 
amended municipal charters,22 as evidenced by the amendment’s text: 
The Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal any 
charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town.  
The legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to 
enact and amend their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution 
and criminal laws of the State of Oregon . . . .23 
 
address social problems frustrated by Dillon’s anti-localist interpretive principle.  E.g., 
Early Estates, Inc. v. Housing Bd. of Rev. of Providence, 174 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1961).  But 
see David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2291–2300 (2003) 
(arguing that Dillon’s Rule enabled more local autonomy than “home rule” regimes that 
immediately followed). 
17 But see Barron, supra note 16. 
18 See City of La Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 157, 576 P.2d 1204, 
1217 (1978), aff’d on reh’g, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978) (Tongue, J., dissenting). 
19 E.g., MO. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1875) (providing cities with populations over 100,000 
the power to “frame a charter for [their] own government, consistent with and subject to 
the Constitution and laws of this State”). 
20 See, e.g., City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Or. 139, 141, 1882 WL 1417, *2–3 (1882). 
21 E.g., Wong v. City of Astoria, 13 Or. 538, 11 P. 295 (1886); see also City of La 
Grande, 281 Or. at 144–45, 576 P.2d at 1209 (“[I]t is a noteworthy fact that most of the 
general municipal legislation [before 1906] was . . . meritorious . . . .”) (quoting Rose v. 
Port of Portland, 82 Or. 541, 558, 162 P. 498, 504 (1917) (discussing the example of the 
Bancroft bonding act)). 
22 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 144–45, 576 P.2d at 1209. 
23 OR. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 944 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 939 
The Home Rule Amendment makes no mention of “home rule.”  
Rather, the amendment’s text focuses on the drafting and amending of 
municipal charters.  In removing the power to change city charters 
from the legislature and vesting it squarely within the city’s voters, 
the amendment nonetheless strengthened municipal autonomy, 
relieving cities of the substantial burden of seeking approval from the 
state legislature for changes to their charters.24  The amendment also 
sought to relieve the state legislature from having to concern itself 
with city charter matters.25 
If the Home Rule Amendment’s effect on a city’s control over its 
charter was clear, the amendment more indirectly affected cities’ 
substantive powers.  On its own, Oregon’s Home Rule Amendment 
did not confer any new municipal authority.  Rather, if a pre-1906 city 
charter staked a claim to broad powers, the amendment simply 
ensured that the state legislature would not impose upon the city a 
charter revision that limited those powers.  Indeed, unlike more recent 
home-rule provisions from other states, the amendment does not 
delegate something akin to the “police power” to municipalities.26  
Hence, if an Oregon city were to enact a charter with limited 
municipal powers, presumably, municipal action that falls outside 
those limited powers would be ultra vires.27  The charters of most 
Oregon cities, however, now include language vesting broad powers 
in the city.  Portland’s charter, for instance, grants the city “all 
governmental powers except such as are expressly conferred by law 
upon other public corporations . . . and subject to the limitations 
prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State.”28  The charters 
of Ashland, Beaverton, Keizer, and Salem, among others, use even 
 
24 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 143–44, 576 P.2d at 1208.  Some Oregon cities, such 
as Portland, incorporated and adopted charters before statehood.  See Sims v. Besaw’s 
Café, 165 Or. App. 180, 206, 997 P.2d 201, 216 (2000) (Edmonds, J., dissenting) 
(discussing Portland’s 1851 charter). 
25 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 143–44, 576 P.2d at 1208–09.  In serving this function, 
the Home Rule Amendment is similar to the ban on special legislation found in many state 
constitutions.  See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. IV, § 23 (prohibiting “certain local and special 
laws”).  They both prevent the legislature from using its time and resources in a manner 
deemed wasteful or unworthy.  See Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and 
Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 970 (1988). 
26 See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5, discussed in State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 
1122 (Utah 1980). 
27 See Adams v. Toledo, 163 Or. 185, 189, 96 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1939) (city’s action not 
“ultra vires” if within charter authority). 
28 PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 1-102 (1962), http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/ 
index.cfm?c=28223&a=13412. 
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broader language.  Salem’s charter, for instance, stakes claim to “all 
powers” that state and federal law “expressly or impliedly grant or 
allow the city” to exercise.29  Therefore, as a practical matter, the 
Home Rule Amendment ensures that Oregon cities can exercise a 
broad range of substantive lawmaking authority.  This authority, 
however, is vulnerable to preemption by the state, as Part III will 
explain. 
Interestingly, Oregon’s Home Rule Amendment mentions neither 
municipal ordinances nor noncriminal state law.  Rather, it refers only 
to “municipal charter[s]” as being “subject to the Constitution and 
criminal laws of the State of Oregon.”  Under a hyper-literal 
interpretation, one might conclude that only charter provisions, and 
not municipal ordinances, need conform to the constitution and 
criminal laws of Oregon.  This argument is perhaps so self-evidently 
absurd that it has not been seriously argued.30  Additionally, one 
might conclude that charter provisions must conform only to the 
state’s constitution and its criminal laws, but not to the state’s civil 
laws.31  While this argument has also never been seriously pressed, 
the amendment’s specific mention of “criminal laws”—and the 
absence of any specific mention of “civil laws”—has led to an 
important distinction in Oregon local government law: the 
amendment establishes a rebuttable presumption that municipal 
criminal ordinances are invalid, whereas civil ordinances are 
presumed valid.32 
What little is known about the Home Rule Amendment’s “meager” 
history33 is that earlier drafts stated that charters be “consistent with 
and subject to the constitution and laws of this state,” without 
specifically mentioning the state’s criminal laws as a constraint on 
 
29 SALEM, OR., CHARTER, CH. 2, § 4 (1996), http://www.cityofsalem.net/ 
Departments/Legal/Pages/CityCharter.aspx#section4; see also ASHLAND, OR., CHARTER, 
art. II, § 1 (2006), http://www.ashland.or.us/Page.asp?NavID=156; BEAVERTON, OR., 
CHARTER, ch. II, § 4 (1981), http://www.codepublishing.com/OR/beaverton/html/ 
beavertonch.html#Section%204; KEIZER, OR., CHARTER, ch. II, § 4 (1985), http:// 
www.keizer.org/action=page&name=City%20Charter %20Chp%202. 
30 Cf. City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 150, 576 P.2d at 1211–12 (noting that the 1906 
amendments were “not designed to exalt form over substance”). 
31 Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy: Oregon’s Home 
Rule Case Frames the Dilemma for State Constitutionalism, 76 OR. L. REV. 909, 913 
(1997). 
32 See City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or. 490, 501, 714 P.2d 220, 227 (1986). 
33 Dollarhide, 300 Or. at 497, 714 P.2d at 224–45. 
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city power.34  Whatever the reasons for this textual change,35 the 
Oregon Supreme Court has assumed that the voters who approved the 
final version of the amendment “envisioned a stricter limitation on the 
lawmaking power of cities in respect of criminal laws than with 
regard to civil or regulatory measures.”36 
Oregon’s dual approach to local criminal and civil lawmaking 
authority is unique among home-rule states.  Most states treat local 
criminal and civil ordinances similarly, although many states confine 
local governments’ power to criminalize conduct to misdemeanors 
only,37 and at least one state appears to prohibit local criminal 
lawmaking entirely.38  Even in those states that limit local authority to 
misdemeanors only, however, challenges to local misdemeanor 
ordinances are not generally afforded a presumption of validity any 
different from that which applies to civil ordinances.39 
 
34 Id. 
35 Compare City of Portland v. Jackson, 316 Or. 143, 166, 850 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1993) 
(Fadeley, J., dissenting) (“Little is recorded about the precise reason for the change from 
the more general limitation of ‘general laws’ to the specific ‘criminal laws’ limitation.”), 
with Cumfer, supra note 31, at 939–43 (suggesting that change was made to prevent cities 
in “dry” counties from going “wet”—i.e., legalizing liquor). 
36 Dollarhide, 300 Or. at 497, 714 P.2d at 225. 
37 See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 5, 9; see also Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow 
Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1435 n.162 (2001) (citing 
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23.06, at 512 (3d ed. 
Rev. 1997 & Supp. 2000)). 
38 See S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 14; Martin v. Condon, 478 S.E.2d 272, 274 (S.C. 1996) 
(“[L]ocal governments may not criminalize conduct that is legal under a statewide 
criminal law.”); Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 442 S.E.2d 608, 609–10 (S.C. 
1994).  To be precise, the South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the state 
constitution as prohibiting municipalities from defining any new crimes, id. at 609, but not 
necessarily from punishing conduct already criminalized by state law so long as the 
municipal penalty is not greater than that allowed by state law.  See also City of N. 
Charleston v. Harper, 410 S.E.2d 569 (S.C. 1991). 
39 A few state courts, however, while not purporting to treat local criminal lawmaking 
differently from local civil law under state constitutional law, have struck down local 
criminal ordinances on federal constitutional grounds like equal protection and vagueness.  
E.g., Seattle v. Hogan, 766 P.2d 1134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Pierce v. Commonwealth, 
777 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1989); People v. Llewellyn, 257 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. 1977).  These 
cases recognize functional concerns regarding local criminal authority similar to those 
discussed below.  E.g., Pierce, 777 S.W.2d at 928 (expressing concern that local criminal 
ordinance may lead to “abusive arrest and prosecution”); Llewellyn, 257 N.W.2d at 907 
(recognizing that “uncertainty and confusion” would be created if each municipality in 
state could define its own obscenity law). 
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II 
THE “ASSUMPTION” AGAINST LOCAL CRIMINAL LAWMAKING 
AUTHORITY 
Oregon courts have generally couched the presumption against 
local criminal ordinances in terms of fealty to the Home Rule 
Amendment’s text and largely overlooked the presumption’s 
functional benefits.40  This Part urges Oregon courts to recognize the 
functional advantages of the amendment’s presumption against local 
criminal lawmaking.  By doing so, the courts could clarify the 
currently murky doctrine in this area. 
A.  Functional Benefits of the Presumption Against Local Criminal 
Lawmaking Authority 
Like local authority to enact civil ordinances, local authority to 
legislate in the criminal realm can lead to a patchwork set of rules 
throughout the state.41  Because it is axiomatic in America that 
ignorance of the law is no defense to a criminal prosecution,42 
however, a balkanized set of criminal laws varying by municipality is 
likely to ensnare unwitting defendants whose conduct would be 
perfectly legal in another part of the state.  In today’s highly mobile 
society, the concerns raised by Harvard Law Professors Francis 
Bohlen and Harry Shulman more than eight decades ago regarding 
municipal criminal lawmaking authority are even more salient: 
People no longer live their whole lives in the village in which they 
were born.  They pass freely from place to place, and in transit go 
through innumerable towns and villages.  The risk of being arrested 
on sight, because one’s conduct contravenes some regulation . . . is 
appalling to any thinking person. . . .  Even that outworn and 
discredited fiction that every man knows the law has never been 
pushed to such an extreme as to justify imposing such consequences 
upon an ignorance of the local ordinances of the myriads of small 
communities through which modern men constantly pass.43 
 
40 See Jackson, 316 Or. at 165–68, 850 P.2d at 1105–07 (Fadeley, J., dissenting). 
41 Dollarhide, 300 Or. at 502 n.9, 714 P.2d at 227 n.9. 
42 Logan, supra note 37, at 1461 n.282. 
43 Id. at 1463 (quoting Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 491–92 (1927)); see also Jackson, 316 Or. at 159 n.9, 
850 P.2d at 1102 n.9 (Fadeley, J., dissenting) (recognizing “destructive effect” of “a 
patchwork pattern of local criminal ordinances”) (citing Winters v. Bisaillon, 152 Or. 578, 
54 P.2d 1169 (1936)). 
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The less likely a defendant is to know the criminal law, the more 
criminal sanctions become unmoored from their justification in 
retributive theory, and, to a lesser degree, in deterrence: One cannot 
be held morally responsible for breaking a law of which he was not 
aware, and the fewer persons who are aware44 of a particular law, the 
less deterrent value that law will have.45 
Criminal ordinances, with their arrest and detention enforcement 
mechanisms, are clearly heavier handed than civil ordinances, which 
usually depend upon monetary fines for their enforcement.46  A 
criminal conviction, however minor, can have serious collateral 
consequences beyond the sentence imposed.47  Moreover, an arrest 
for even a relatively minor criminal offense allows police to search a 
suspect and gain evidence of other crimes, thereby providing cities 
with an incentive to over-criminalize in an attempt to crack down on 
certain crimes.48  For instance, in State v. Tyler, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals considered the case of a defendant arrested under a Portland 
ordinance that criminalized the crossing of a street at a nonright 
angle.49  The officer who arrested the alleged jaywalker admitted that 
he apprehended her for the pedestrian offense as a pretext to search 
for contraband.50  The officer found cocaine on the defendant’s 
person, and she was subsequently charged with possession.51  The 
court dismissed the charges because state law, which evinced a clear 
preference for not criminalizing minor traffic violations, impliedly 
preempted the offense underlying the initial arrest.52 
 
44 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2007) (noting that under retributive theory “only blameworthy 
defendants” should be punished for their crimes). 
45 Id. at 1210 (explaining deterrence function of criminal law).  Of course, if the courts 
upheld a local criminal ordinance, more outsiders might eventually learn about it through 
word-of-mouth, media coverage of arrests and prosecutions, and signs posted by the 
enacting city on its borders. 
46 To be sure, the line between a “criminal” and “civil” ordinance is not always a bright 
one.  See Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 101–03, 570 P.2d 52, 57–59 
(1977) (discussing factors relevant to categorizing an offense as a “crime” rather than an 
“infraction”). 
47 See Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 585 (2006). 
48 Logan, supra note 37, at 1441–42. 
49 168 Or. App. 600, 602, 7 P.3d 624, 626 (2000). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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1.  The Presumption Against Local Criminal Authority As a Default 
Rule 
Oregon’s assumption against local criminal lawmaking authority 
operates as a default rule of statutory interpretation.  The state 
legislature may overcome the default presumption against local 
criminal lawmaking authority by expressly empowering cities to pass 
criminal laws in a certain subject area.  In the absence of such an 
express grant, the authority of an Oregon city to legislate in the 
criminal realm is more suspect.  To be sure, default-rule theories of 
statutory interpretation are subject to a number of criticisms.53  My 
primary aim here, however, is not to engage those criticisms but to 
explain why, under the logic of viewing statutory presumptions as 
default rules, the Home Rule Amendment’s presumption against local 
criminal lawmaking authority is a good choice. 
Working from the assumption that judicial canons operate like 
default rules, Professor Einer Elhauge has urged courts to choose a 
“penalty-default” rule when an interest group arguing for a particular 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute is likely to have superior access 
to the legislature than its opponents and the interim costs of an 
“erroneous” decision—that is, a decision that inaccurately estimates 
the current legislature’s political preference—are relatively low.54  
Elhauge argues that a decision adverse to the better-organized interest 
group is likely to spur that interest group to seek a “legislative 
correction” of the decision.55  Building upon Elhauge’s theory, 
Professor Roderick Hills argues that use of a penalty-default rule in 
the context of preemption can enhance the democratic process.  By 
siding with the weaker interest group, Hills argues, courts force the 
stronger interest group to turn to the legislature for relief from the 
judicial decision it dislikes.56  While the legislature may ultimately 
grant the better-organized interest group the legislative override that it 
seeks, the court’s ruling in favor of the weaker interest group will 
force the legislature to confront an issue that it would have otherwise 
 
53 For more on the pros and cons of default-rule theory of statutory interpretation, 
compare Diller, supra note 1, at 1146–48 (recognizing limitations), with Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2142 
(2002) (arguing in favor). 
54 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2162, 2178 (2002). 
55 Id. at 2173. 
56 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007). 
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avoided had the courts not applied the penalty-default rule.57  
Moreover, the weaker interest group will have a better chance at 
defending its position if the judiciary interprets an ambiguous statute 
in its favor, thereby placing legislative inertia on its side.58 
In another article I have argued that the penalty-default rule 
advocated by Elhauge and Hills should cut against the business 
community’s frequent claims of implied preemption against local 
regulatory ordinances they dislike.59  The business community is 
likely to have more clout in lobbying the state legislature to “correct” 
a court’s denial of its implied preemption claim than the cities 
defending their lawmaking authority.60  Criminal defendants, on the 
other hand, are likely to constitute a weaker interest group as 
compared to cities, at least when the defendants are, as in most cases, 
a motley collection of individuals rather than corporations or wealthy, 
 
57 Id. 
58 See Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 301 (2008) (explaining 
difficulty of overcoming inertia in legislative process).  To be sure, Elhauge’s “penalty-
default rule” is open to a number of criticisms.  First, it is not always clear how many and 
which interest groups have a stake in the court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute in a 
legal dispute that involves a discrete number of parties.  While amicus briefs may provide 
a clue to the interest-group lineup, few are filed at the initial stages of litigation.  Even if 
all of the potentially affected interest groups were readily identifiable, it is not always clear 
who is “weaker” or “stronger” politically.  Indeed, identifying and assessing the relative 
political strength of interest groups is not a traditional judicial function and may not be 
within the judiciary’s institutional competence.  Moreover, the relative strength and 
weakness of interest groups can change quickly depending on the partisan makeup of the 
legislature and the executive branch.  For instance, when the Supreme Court, in the case of 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), interpreted Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act as prohibiting claims for sex-based wage discrimination arising before 
the 180-day charging period, one might have thought that the majority had sided with the 
“stronger” interest group: the businesses likely to be defendants in such suits.  Democrats 
in Congress denounced the decision immediately, and sought to override it legislatively.  
After being stymied by a Senate filibuster (and facing a certain veto by President George 
W. Bush) before the 2008 elections, see Carl Hulse, Republican Senators Block Pay 
Discrimination Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at A22, Congress, with the help of 
an expanded Democratic majority in the Senate and the support of President Barack 
Obama, overturned Ledbetter in January 2009 with the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2 § 181, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Obama Signs Equal Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.  The episode 
indicates that by 2009, plaintiffs’ lawyers, women’s rights organizations, and civil rights 
groups constituted the “stronger” interest group than the business lobby, at least on the 
issue of employee pay raised by the Court’s Ledbetter decision, whereas a year or two 
before, business groups who supported the decision had superior lobbying clout. 
59 Diller, supra note 1, at 1149–51. 
60 Id. at 1150–51. 
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white-collar criminals.  Such individual criminal defendants have no 
institutional interest in the legal regime that affects them, and the few 
organized interest groups that sometimes push for positions 
advantageous to criminal defendants, such as state chapters of the 
ACLU and the criminal defense bar, are generally politically weak.61  
Moreover, the interim costs of an “erroneous” decision that an 
ordinance is not preempted—thus upholding a criminal conviction 
based on local law—is much higher than an “erroneous” decision 
regarding preemption in the civil context.  Indeed, the potential costs 
in the criminal context are unquantifiable, as they may include the 
deprivation of the defendant’s liberty and the stigma of a criminal 
record.62 
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in City of Portland v. Lodi 
illustrates well the functional value served by the Home Rule 
Amendment’s assumption against local criminal lawmaking.63  In 
Lodi, defendants were charged with violating Portland’s penal 
ordinance against carrying a concealed pocketknife with a blade 
beyond a specified length.64  Concluding that Portland could not 
overcome “the assumption that state criminal law displaces 
conflicting local ordinances,” the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated 
Portland’s ordinance.65  The Lodi defendant’s conduct would likely 
have been perfectly legal if it took place in a neighboring 
municipality because state law did not criminalize the concealed 
carrying of pocketknives on the basis of length. Nor did Portland 
assert that neighboring municipalities had similar bans.66  Merely 
crossing the border into Portland made the defendants’ conduct 
illegal, whether they knew of Portland’s more restrictive ordinance or 
not, thereby subjecting them to arrest, search, detention, and, had the 
ordinance been upheld, criminal prosecution and a likely criminal 
record. 
 
61 See id. at 1137 n.107. 
62 But see Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of 
Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) (arguing that constitutional liberty interests 
should, in certain circumstances, be protected only by a “liability rule” entitlement). 
63 308 Or. 468, 782 P.2d 415 (1989). 
64 Lodi, 308 Or. at 471, 782 P.2d at 415. 
65 Lodi, 308 Or. at 472, 782 P.2d at 416 (quoting City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or. 
490, 501, 714 P.2d 220, 227 (1986) (emphasis in original)). 
66 Lodi, 308 Or. at 473, 782 P.2d at 417 (discussing OR. REV. STAT. § 166.240(1)). 
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2.  Objections to the Presumption Against Local Criminal Lawmaking 
Authority as an Appropriate Default Rule 
There are sometimes good reasons why Oregon cities seek to 
regulate through criminal, rather than civil, enforcement.  While cities 
may impose hefty civil fines for violations of ordinances in an effort 
to spur compliance with some new regulation, the threat of criminal 
sanctions may be more effective in certain circumstances.  It must be 
recognized, therefore, that the assumption against local criminal 
lawmaking comes with a potential cost that might not be outweighed 
by concerns about potential defendants in all circumstances. 
Not all those who might be prosecuted under a local criminal law 
are as sympathetic as the defendants in Lodi.  For instance, when the 
defendants are long-term residents, property owners, or sophisticated 
business enterprises that receive professional legal advice on a 
consistent basis, attributing knowledge of the local law to them may 
seem more reasonable.  Moreover, while the average cohort of 
criminal defendants likely possesses little legislative clout, there may 
be certain discrete groups of criminal defendants—such as businesses 
and wealthy, white-collar criminals—who have significant influence 
with legislators and therefore are less deserving of a “penalty default 
rule” that works in their favor.67 
Another potential objection to Oregon’s presumption against 
criminal lawmaking authority is that it can prevent an Oregon city 
from filling an interstice of state criminal law to address a serious 
problem that is unique to that city, at least not without lobbying the 
legislature for express permission, a potentially costly and time-
consuming process.  To be sure, the city could attempt to address 
whatever problem it is seeking to solve exclusively through civil 
means.68  If the city attempts to pass a criminal ordinance in an area 
in which the state has legislated—and particularly in areas in which 
the state has legislated extensively—Oregon courts applying the 
default rule against local criminal authority are likely to find such an 
ordinance preempted.  For instance, in Tyler, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals invalidated a municipal ordinance criminalizing jaywalking 
 
67 Insofar as a soon-to-be corrected statutory interpretation sustains a criminal 
prosecution of an individual, however, that individual may lose his liberty or suffer the 
stigma of other criminal punishments, which means that the interim costs of the 
interpretation may be quite high. 
68 Dollarhide, 300 Or. at 503, 714 P.2d at 228. 
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in large part because the state legislature had comprehensively 
rewritten the Oregon Vehicle Code in a way that evinced a “conscious 
decision” not to criminalize minor traffic infractions such as 
jaywalking.69  Similarly, in Lodi, the Oregon Supreme Court relied on 
the state legislature’s revisions to concealed weapons laws to deduce 
that the legislature made “a political decision” not to criminalize the 
concealed possession of knives—such as the pocketknife defendant 
carried—not mentioned in the statute.70  Also, in City of Portland v. 
Dollarhide, the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated Portland’s 
mandatory minimum sentences for prostitution convictions in light of 
the extensive state regulation and Portland’s inability to point to 
anything abnegating the presumption that the state law, which had no 
minimum sentences, trumped the local ordinance.71  Although the 
courts’ decisions in these cases may have been justified for the 
functional reasons explained above, they prevented, at least 
theoretically, a city from filling some void in criminal enforcement 
left open by state law. 
B.  Doctrinal Inconsistency 
Rather than using the functional value of the Home Rule 
Amendment’s assumption against local criminal authority as a 
guiding principle when ruling on challenges to local ordinances, the 
Oregon Supreme Court has often engaged in an unhelpful search for 
legislative “intent.”  This misguided focus on intent has resulted in 
confused and inconsistent applications of the amendment to local 
criminal laws.  At the root of the recent confusion are two dicta from 
Dollarhide and Lodi, decided in 1986 and 1989, respectively, that are 
in significant tension with each other.  In Dollarhide, Justice Carson 
wrote that the Home Rule Amendment’s “assumption . . . that the 
legislature intended to displace conflicting local criminal ordinances, 
absent apparent legislative intent to the contrary, does not apply when 
there is no state criminal law on the subject.”72  In Lodi, by contrast, 
Justice Linde remarked that the question of preemption should be 
resolved by looking for a “political decision” of the legislature—“for 
what the state’s lawmakers either did or considered and chose not to 
 
69 State v. Tyler, 168 Or. App. 600, 605–06, 7 P.3d 624, 628 (2000). 
70 Lodi, 308 Or. at 474, 782 P.2d at 417. 
71 Dollarhide, 300 Or. at 501, 714 P.2d at 227. 
72 Dollarhide, 300 Or. at 502 n.9, 714 P.2d at 227 n.9. 
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do.”73  Hence, according to Justice Linde’s dictum, were the state 
legislature to consider, but vote down, a law criminalizing a 
previously unregulated subject—say, the serving of trans fats in 
restaurants—that “political decision” would counsel in favor of 
finding a later municipal attempt to criminalize trans fats 
preempted.74  Per Justice Carson’s Dollarhide dictum, however, the 
lack of a state law on the subject—apparently, regardless of the 
reasons for the void—would mean that there is no presumption 
against the validity of a later municipal ordinance on the same 
subject. 
While the distinction between Justices Linde’s and Carson’s dicta 
may seem minor and technical, it proves increasingly significant 
when the “subject” of a municipal criminal law is defined narrowly.  
For instance, in City of Portland v. Jackson, decided in 1993, the 
Oregon Supreme Court upheld a Portland ordinance that criminalized 
indecent exposure committed without intent to arouse, whereas state 
law criminalized only exposure with such intent.75  The court rejected 
the defendant’s argument that the legislature’s 1971 replacement of 
the prior indecent exposure statute, which “[a]rguably” applied to 
both sexually motivated and nonsexually motivated exposure, with a 
version that contained an intent-to-arouse requirement, evinced “a 
legislative political decision to permit non-sexually motivated public 
nudity.”76  Under Justice Linde’s approach, the legislature’s revision 
of the statute in 1971, without more, might be enough of a “political 
decision” to preempt future local lawmaking on the “subject” of 
indecent exposure with no intent to arouse.  Under Justice Carson’s 
dictum, however, the absence of state law on the more narrowly 
defined “subject” of “indecent exposure with no intent to arouse” 
means that the presumption against local criminal lawmaking does 
not apply, an approach embraced by the Jackson majority.77  The 
Jackson majority attempted to distinguish Lodi by stating that the 
legislature was “silent” as to its reasons for amending the indecent 
exposure statute, whereas the court in Lodi had invoked the legislative 
 
73 Lodi, 308 Or. at 474, 782 P.2d at 417. 
74 On the other hand, Justice Linde noted in Lodi that “mere inaction on a bill or other 
proposal”—as distinct from active “rejection of a proposal by vote after debate”—would 
not amount to the kind of “collective,” “political decision” necessary to infer an intent to 
permit certain behavior.  Lodi, 308 Or. at 474, 782 P.2d at 417. 
75 City of Portland v. Jackson, 316 Or. 143, 850 P.2d 1093 (1993). 
76 Jackson, 316 Or. at 153, 850 P.2d at 1098. 
77 See also City of Dallas v. Sullenger, 111 Or. App. 266, 826 P.2d 34 (1992). 
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history of a “political decision” not to criminalize concealed 
pocketknives.78  In fact, the Lodi court did not cite the reasons for the 
legislature’s rejection of the criminalization of pocketknives; the 
rejection itself—without additional explanation—served as sufficient 
evidence for the court to infer a decision by the legislature. 
Dollarhide, Lodi, and Jackson demonstrate that the judicial search 
for a “political decision” by the legislature not to criminalize some 
“subject” of conduct is highly manipulable.  The “subject” covered by 
the criminal law at issue can be expanded and contracted like an 
accordion.  Additionally, the search for whether the legislature made a 
sufficiently “conscious” decision not to criminalize certain conduct 
presses the judiciary to analyze the murky, Sphinx-like reasons for 
legislative inaction.79  A better approach would incorporate some 
consideration of the functional concerns articulated above.  That is, 
the courts might look at whether the criminal law is likely to apply to 
defendants, such as property and business owners, for whom notice is 
less of a concern, rather than to individuals who may have no 
connection to the community and are likely to be ensnared by a rule 
they could not reasonably anticipate.80  Courts might also analyze 
whether criminal sanctions are the first method of ordinance 
enforcement, or merely a more severe punishment for repeat 
offenders who were earlier punished with civil penalties.  
Additionally, Oregon courts might assess the extent to which a 
particular municipality has publicized its unusual laws, whether 
through television advertising or signs posted at city limits.  In all, an 
incorporation of these functional concerns—rather than a purported 
focus on whether the state legislature has made a “political 
decision”—would offer a better, or at least another useful, guidepost 
for assessing the validity of local criminal laws under Oregon’s Home 
Rule Amendment.81 
 
78 Jackson, 316 Or. at 149, 850 P.2d at 1096. 
79 Cf. Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. 
COMMENT. 395, 396 n.8 (1986) (“Interpreting what [the legislature] means when it has 
spoken is often difficult enough; to determine what [the legislature] means when it has 
said nothing at all is impossible.”). 
80 See Pierce v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Ky. 1989) (invalidating local 
law criminalizing sodomy solicitation because it might result in the “abusive arrest and 
prosecution” of persons for “inadvertent act[s]” not included within the state’s criminal 
law). 
81 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, an oddity of Oregon’s home-rule 
criminal jurisprudence is that Oregon cities may pass criminal laws that prohibit exactly 
the same conduct proscribed by state law.  E.g., Jackson, 316 Or. at 169, 850 P.2d at 
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III 
UNDERCUTTING HOME RULE ON THE CIVIL SIDE 
While the Oregon Home Rule Amendment’s assumption against 
criminal lawmaking authority offers functional benefits, its 
assumption in favor of local authority on the civil side promises to 
enable local governments to serve as “proving grounds” for policies 
that have yet to win acceptance at the state and national levels.82  
Indeed, cities serve as crucial policy innovators in identifying and 
attempting to solve social problems, often in response to perceived 
inaction or insufficient action by the state and federal governments.83  
Once a city’s new policy on a certain subject “works” (e.g., it is 
politically popular, economically feasible, or reasonably effective at 
addressing the social problem it purports to help solve) other cities, 
and eventually states, around the country will often adopt an identical 
 
1107–08 (Fadeley, J., dissenting) (“Local criminal ordinances which duplicate state 
criminal law . . . are to be tolerated and even encouraged . . . .”); City of Portland v. 
Dollarhide, 300 Or. 490, 499, 714 P.2d 220, 226 (1986) (“local ordinances may punish the 
same criminal conduct [as] state law”).  In many other states, by contrast, such as 
California, duplicative local ordinances that penalize conduct already criminalized by state 
law are prohibited.  E.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Los Angeles, 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 
1993).  To be sure, Oregon cities are prohibited from imposing penalties greater than state 
law for the same crime.  Dollarhide, 300 Or. at 499, 714 P.2d at 226.  Additionally, since 
the Supreme Court held in 1970, in the case of Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, that states 
and municipalities are not separate sovereigns for the purposes of double jeopardy, 
prosecutors cannot constitutionally charge a defendant with a municipal and state crime 
covering precisely the same criminal conduct.  The availability of duplicative local laws, 
therefore, would seem to provide prosecutors with no real advantage.  In practicality, 
however, Oregon’s encouragement of duplicative local criminal ordinances may provide 
state prosecutors in circuit court with more charging leverage against defendants.  Even if, 
in theory, charging a defendant with a state and local crime criminalizing the same conduct 
violates Waller, it is the rare defendant who will raise the Double Jeopardy challenge 
rather than plea out.  Cf. Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of 
Criminal Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 879, 937–38 (2007).  The most likely explanation for 
the persistence of local duplicative lawmaking authority, an anachronism of pre-Waller 
days, appears to be its link to Oregon’s continued use of municipal, justice, and county 
courts.  These courts, which are separate from the circuit court system of the state’s 
judiciary, see OR. REV. STAT. § 1.855 (2007), 
http://www.ojd.state.or.us/courts/othercourts/index.htm, offer municipalities a chance to 
reap fines from those who have violated local ordinances, see George M. Platt, An Odd 
Couple: The Criminal Sanction and the Municipal Ordinance, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 43, 59 
n.63 (1971). 
82 Sims v. Besaw’s Café, 165 Or. App. 180, 200 n.3, 997 P.2d 201, 213 n.3 (2000) 
(Linder, J., concurring). 
83 See Diller, supra note 1, at 1117–22. 
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or similar proposal.84  This process of policy percolation enriches our 
political system by allowing cities to conduct smaller-scale policy 
experiments that may ultimately prove instructive to other cities, 
states, and the federal government.  Recent examples of this 
phenomenon are myriad, ranging from New York City’s ban of trans 
fats to combat obesity—which has since been adopted by a number of 
other local governments as well as one state (California)85—to cities 
and counties outlawing private discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, a policy which has now been adopted by approximately 
twenty states, including Oregon in 2007.86  Even when there is little 
or no policy percolation resulting from a particular municipality’s 
action, local innovation is still useful because the action taken by a 
single municipality may improve the quality of life for the residents 
of that municipality, perhaps by solving a social problem that is 
unique to the community.87 
For cities to engage in meaningful policy innovation, state law 
must guarantee two things.  First, because cities, according to Hunter, 
lack any inherent authority under federal law, the state must delegate 
them substantive lawmaking authority.  In the vast majority of (but 
not all) states, cities now have broad lawmaking powers by virtue of 
home-rule provisions in the state constitution or statutes.88  In 
Oregon, the Home Rule Amendment, despite its unusual, charter-
specific language, has been construed to solidify this authority, 
providing Oregon cities with reasonable assurance that their actions 
will not be deemed ultra vires, at least on the civil side.89  Second, 
even if cities have the organic authority to make law, preemption of 
their enactments—whether in implied or express form—by the state 
legislature looms as a threat over their ability to serve as policy 
 
84 See Besaw’s Café, 165 Or. App. at 200 n.3, 997 P.2d at 213  n.3 (Linder, J., 
concurring); Diller, supra note 1, at 1117–19. 
85 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114377 (2009); Jennifer Steinhauer, California 
Bars Restaurant Use of Trans Fats, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008, at A1. 
86 See Act of May 9, 2007, ch. 100, § 29, 2007 Oregon Laws (to be codified at OR. REV. 
STAT. § 659.850 (2007)); Press Release, Chip Alfred, Equal. Forum, 94.4% of the 2008 
Fortune 500 Provide Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination: Senator Obama and Senator 
McCain Take Opposite Positions on Sexual Orientation Workplace Protection (Aug. 27, 
2008), http://www.equalityforum.com/newsite/news_item.cfm?id=2. 
87 See Diller, supra note 1, at 1128–29. 
88 See id. at 1127 n.65. 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 26 to 29; Besaw’s Café, 165 Or. App. at 184 n.4, 
997 P.2d at 204 n.4. 
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“proving grounds.”90  All other things being equal, cities will be more 
likely to adopt new and innovative policies if fewer substantive areas 
have been preempted by the state.  In many states with home rule, 
municipal authority has been eroded not just by legislative express 
preemption, but also by the judicial doctrine of implied preemption.91 
In Oregon, by contrast, the courts interpreting the Home Rule 
Amendment have articulated a strong presumption—or assumption—
against implied preemption in the civil realm.92  This presumption 
encourages local autonomy and discourages opponents of local 
regulation—often businesses and public-sector labor unions—from 
running to the courts to challenge local ordinances that they argue 
conflict with state law or invade a field that state law has completely 
“occupied.”93  On the other hand, at least since City of La Grande, the 
Oregon Supreme Court has interpreted the Home Rule Amendment as 
providing no immunity to cities from express preemption on 
“substantive social, economic, or regulatory” matters.94  As this 
section will explore, Oregon’s legislature and voters (through 
statewide initiatives) have frequently enacted laws expressly 
preempting municipal authority, thereby limiting the ability of 
Oregon’s cities to serve as policy “proving grounds.”  This 
phenomenon has prevented Oregon cities from adopting innovative 
responses to different social and economic problems, thereby limiting 
their ability to lead the nation in municipal policymaking. 
 
90 GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND 70 (2008) (observing from 
interviews with local officials that preemption and the threat of litigation related to 
preemption constrain local authority); Barron, supra note 16, at 2357 (“[C]ourts . . . have 
adopted an expansive view of state preemption [of anti-discrimination ordinances], which 
makes it particularly difficult for municipal officials to be confident that their innovative 
antidiscrimination measures will survive judicial challenge.”); Richard Briffault, Home 
Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 264 (2004); Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 639–40 (2001). 
91 Rodriguez, supra note 90, at 639–40 (referring to the prospect of implied preemption 
of municipal authority as a “dilemma for local governments”). 
92 Denton Plastics, Inc. v. City of Portland, 105 Or. App. 302, 305, 804 P.2d 1199, 1201 
(1991); Haley v. City of Troutdale, 281 Or. 203, 209–11, 576 P.2d 1238, 1242–43 (1978); 
Or. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Corvallis, 166 Or. App. 506, 999 P.2d 518 (2000); Besaw’s 
Café, 165 Or. App. at 191, 997 P.2d at 191; Covey Drive Yourself & Garage v. City of 
Portland, 157 Or. 117, 123, 70 P.2d 566, 569 (1937).  But see Fischer v. Miller, 228 Or. 
54, 55, 363 P.2d 1109, 1110 (1961); Thunderbird Mobile Home LLC v. Wilsonville, No. 
cv-05-110027, slip op. (Clack. Cty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2007). 
93 See Diller, supra note 1, at 1134–37. 
94 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204 (1978), aff’d on reh’g, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978). 
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A.  Express Preemption 
As a federal constitutional matter, under Hunter, the state 
legislature may preempt any action of a local government.  To 
promote local autonomy, however, many of the earliest home-rule 
regimes preserved, through the state constitution, some residuum of 
exclusive authority over “local” affairs for cities.95  Concomitantly, 
many of these systems limited the lawmaking power of cities to this 
“local” realm.96  Thus, these early regimes created a protected “local” 
realm that the state legislature could not invade as a matter of state 
constitutional law.  This early form of home rule became known as 
“imperio” because it established essentially separate—and 
exclusive—realms in which a city and state might legislate, thereby 
making a city an “imperium” within the “imperio” of a state.97  In an 
imperio home-rule system, which a handful of states retain today in 
some form,98 state courts serve as the ultimate arbiter of city power 
because they decide which subjects are “local” and which are not.99  
Over time, most states have revised or replaced their imperio home-
rule systems because courts often interpreted “local” quite narrowly, 
which constricted the subject areas in which a city could legally 
legislate.100 
Most states that replaced imperio home rule, and other states that 
adopted home rule later in the twentieth century, adopted a 
“legislative” or “legislative supremacy” system of home rule.101  In a 
legislative home-rule system, the state constitution grants cities 
extensive lawmaking power that is not limited to the “local” realm.102  
 
95 Diller, supra note 1, at 1124–25. 
96 Id. 
97 St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893); City of New Orleans v. 
Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 640 So. 2d 237, 241–42 (La. 1994) (reviewing the 
“imperio” model of home rule); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power 
Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 660–61 (1964). 
98 It is difficult to offer a precise count of “imperio” states due to a certain amount of 
ambiguity in states’ constitutions, laws, and judicial decisions on the matter.  Nonetheless, 
estimates of “imperio” regimes range from “very few,” David J. Barron, A Localist 
Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 392 (2001), to nineteen.  Timothy D. 
Mead, Federalism and State Law: Legal Factors Constraining and Facilitating Local 
Initiatives, in HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 31, 36 (John J. 
Gargan ed., 1997). 
99 Barron, supra note 16, at 2325–26; Sandalow, supra note 97, at 660. 
100 Sandalow, supra note 97, at 660. 
101 Diller, supra note 1, at 1125–26. 
102 Id. 
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At the same time, this grant of municipal power is usually conditioned 
upon cities not taking any action inconsistent with or preempted by 
state law.103  In a legislative home-rule system, therefore, the 
legislature can deprive cities of authority to regulate in any area the 
legislature chooses, even if the subject area is one that would be 
considered “local” in an imperio system. 
Whether Oregon’s Home Rule Amendment established an imperio 
or legislative regime was in some doubt until 1978 when a sharply 
divided state supreme court, in the landmark case of City of La 
Grande, interpreted the amendment as establishing something more 
akin to a legislative system.104  The case arose when two cities, La 
Grande and Astoria, challenged a 1971 state law that required all 
municipal police officers and firemen to be brought within the state’s 
retirement system unless the city provided equal or better retirement 
benefits.105  Similarly, the law mandated that cities pay premiums on 
a state-administered life insurance policy for these employees’ job-
related deaths unless the city provided equal or better benefits.106  La 
Grande and Astoria claimed that the state law amounted to an 
unfunded mandate in violation of the cities’ powers under the Home 
Rule Amendment.  More specifically, La Grande and Astoria argued 
that the law, by affecting a municipality’s relationship with its own 
employees, invaded a protected “local” domain that the amendment 
exclusively reserved to cities.107  In support of their argument, La 
Grande and Astoria relied heavily on the 1962 case of State ex rel. 
Heinig v. City of Milwaukie, in which the Oregon Supreme Court read 
the Home Rule Amendment as establishing an imperio-like regime, at 
least with respect to municipal employees.108  Heinig also declared 
 
103 Id. 
104 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204, aff’d on reh’g, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978). 
105 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 139, 576 P.2d at 1206 (citing Or. Laws 1971, ch. 692, 
codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 237.610–237.640). 
106 Id. (citing Or. Laws 1971, ch. 692, codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 243.005–243.055 
(2007)). 
107 Id. 
108 231 Or. 473, 479, 373 P.2d 680, 684 (1962) (“[W]e hold that the people of a city are 
not subject to the will of the Legislature in the management of purely local, municipal 
business in which the state at large is not interested . . . .”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
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that the state legislature could not legislate in areas of “local concern” 
without a “discernible pervading state interest.”109 
In an opinion authored by Justice Linde, the City of La Grande 
majority did not purport to overrule Heinig.  Rather, the court 
distinguished Heinig on its facts and sharply reduced its scope.110  
After tracing the history of the Home Rule Amendment, as well as 
judicial interpretations of it, Justice Linde concluded that the 
provision, as evidenced by its charter-specific language, was designed 
to protect “the structure and procedures of local agencies” from state 
interference.111  By contrast, the court concluded that the amendment 
allows state legislation to trump conflicting municipal policies when 
the state action is directed toward “substantive social, economic, or 
other regulatory objectives,” like the 1971 employee benefits law at 
issue.112  Only when “the [state] law is shown to be irreconcilable 
with the local community’s freedom to choose its own political form” 
would a conflict between city and state law be resolved in favor of the 
city.113  In addressing the dissent’s reading of the amendment, under 
which city decisions regarding “local” affairs—even those involving 
substantive social or economic goals—would be immune from 
preemption by the state, Justice Linde rejected the notion that the 
judiciary was well-suited to determine whether a subject of regulation 
was appropriately “local” or “statewide.”  Believing that this inquiry 
was more political than judicial, Justice Linde opined that it was 
better suited to the legislature.114  Justice Linde noted that were the 
court to agree that matters involving “local personnel” were reserved 
only to cities, as the plaintiff cities argued, it would “raise doubt 
whether local employees must also be excluded from all state 
occupational qualifications or state protective laws,” such as wage 
and hour standards and nondiscrimination.115 
 
109 Heinig, 231 Or. at 684, 373 P.2d at 684; see also Boyle v. Bend, 234 Or. 91, 98 n.6, 
380 P.2d 625, 629 n.6 (1963) (“[A] statute is inoperative to the extent that it conflicts with 
an ordinance on a matter of local concern.”) (quoting Heinig). 
110 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 146–47, 576 P.2d at 1210 (concluding “that the Heinig 
formula should [not] be extended beyond the context . . . in which it was formulated”). 
111 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 156, 576 P.2d at 1215. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 153–54, 576 P.2d at 1213–14; see also City of La 
Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd. (City of La Grande II), 284 Or. 173, 184–86, 586 P.2d 
765, 771–72 (1978). 
115 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 153, 576 P.2d at 1213.  For further discussion of 
whether the Home Rule Amendment prohibits a state law from affecting a city’s 
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The majority opinion invited two dissents, including a sharp 
dissent authored by Justice Tongue who accused the one-vote 
majority of overturning the “long-established concept” that Oregon 
cities had “exclusive power to legislate as to all matters of ‘local 
interest’ . . . free from intervention by the state legislature.”116  
Whether the City of La Grande majority or dissents showed more 
fealty to the precedents interpreting the Home Rule Amendment 
between 1906 and 1978 is hard to say.117  Although the majority’s 
holding exposed local action to more potential subject-matter 
preemption than the dissent’s proposed holding, even the majority 
embraced a modified version of an imperio system: Local charter 
provisions and ordinances that govern the “structures and procedures” 
or “form” of local government are immune—or at least nearly 
immune—from meddling by the state legislature.118  On the other 
hand, in matters of substantive social and economic policy, the 
Oregon legislature—as well as the state’s voters—may preempt any 
municipal action119 for any reason not otherwise prohibited by law.120  
 
relationship with its employees, see City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters, 292 
Or. 266, 273–84, 639 P.2d 90, 95–101 (1981) (upholding state’s Public Employee 
Collective Bargaining Act as applied to city employees); City of Roseburg, 292 Or. at 
298–99, 639 P.2d at 109 (Linde, J., concurring) (noting that state legislation dealing with 
municipal employment practices “meets the strongest ‘home rule’ objections and causes 
the most difficult legal issues”). 
116 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 157, 576 P.2d at 1216. 
117 See Randy Sterns, Comment, Home Rule in Oregon After La Grande v. Public 
Employment Retirement Board, 15 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 311, 323 (1979) (arguing that 
the City of La Grande majority departed from home-rule precedent). 
118 City of La Grande leaves some room for state laws to override local provisions 
related to municipal structure and procedure when “justified by a need to safeguard the 
interests of persons or entities affected by the procedures of local government.”  City of La 
Grande, 281 Or. at 156, 576 P.2d at 1215. 
119 Id.  Despite the fact that home-rule counties are governed by a different provision of 
the Oregon constitution than cities, the Oregon Court of Appeals has assumed, without any 
extensive analysis, that the City of La Grande framework applies to counties as well.  E.g., 
GTE Nw. Inc. v. Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 179 Or. App. 46, 52 n.4, 39 P.3d 201, 205 n.4 
(2002); see also GTE Nw., 179 Or. App. at 64–65, 39 P.3d at 211 (Armstrong, J., 
concurring); Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Multnomah County, 68 Or. App. 375, 378 n.2, 681 
P.2d 797, 798 n.2 (1984) (“The parties did not brief or argue whether there is any 
substantive difference between county and city home rule charter provisions in the 
constitution. . . . For the purposes of this opinion, we assume that there is not.”).  This is a 
curious assumption in light of the textual differences between article XI, section 2, and the 
county home-rule provision—article VI, section 10.  Buchanan v. Wood, 79 Or. App. 722, 
731 n.1, 720 P.2d 1285, 1290 n.1 (1986) (Joseph, C.J., dissenting) (“I do not necessarily 
agree that LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB has anything to do with a county home rule charter 
under Article VI, section 10.”) (citations omitted).  For an extensive discussion of county 
 2008] The  Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home Rule in Oregon 963 
This partial imperio system immunizing local decisions regarding 
government form and procedure is unique to Oregon and has been 
suggested by local government scholars as a template for other 
states.121 
As discussed above, Oregon courts have applied a rather stringent 
standard for claims of implied preemption, at least on the civil side.  
Since City of La Grande, therefore, interest groups are most apt to 
look to the state legislature or the initiative process for relief from 
local regulation they oppose.122  The legislature, and somewhat less 
frequently, the voters, have at times lent a sympathetic ear to such 
interest groups and hastily preempted areas in which Oregon cities 
were just beginning to tread.  For instance, in the 1990s, 
municipalities around the country began enacting ordinances banning 
smoking in indoor public spaces, including bars and restaurants, 
which had previously been exempt or partially exempt from state and 
local laws on the issue.123  In 1998, California became the first state 
to adopt such a smoking ban statewide.  Many other cities, counties, 
and some states around the nation followed in a paradigmatic example 
of policy percolation.124  In Oregon, Corvallis first enacted a 
comprehensive smoking ban in 1998.125  Eugene and Philomath 
 
home rule in Oregon, see Orval Etter, County Home Rule in Oregon Reaches Majority, 61 
OR. L. REV. 3 (1982). 
120 To be sure, federal law—particularly, federal constitutional guarantees like equal 
protection—remain a constraint on the state’s ability to preempt local enactments, 
particularly where the federal courts detect an impermissible motive for the preemption.  
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, 
a statewide initiative preempting city ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) 
(invalidating, on equal protection grounds, a statewide initiative that prohibited Seattle 
from engaging in voluntary school busing). 
121 Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 28–
29 (2006). 
122 Diller, supra note 1, at 1133. 
123 The first municipalities to ban smoking in all public buildings, including bars and 
restaurants, were San Luis Obispo and Lodi, California, as well as Aspen, Colorado, all in 
1990.  See Robert Reinhold, Los Angeles Journal; In a Smoking Ban, Some See Ashes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990, at A22. 
124 See James Rosen, Tobacco Is a Loser on Various Fronts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 
27, 2003, at D1 (noting that, by 2003, four states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, and 
Massachusetts) had followed California in extending their workplace smoking bans to 
include bars). 
125 Or. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Corvallis, 166 Or. App. 506, 508, 999 P.2d 518, 519 
(2000). 
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adopted similar bans shortly thereafter.126  The bar and restaurant 
lobby first turned to the courts to stop the bans, arguing that the 
Corvallis ban conflicted with the preexisting, less stringent statewide 
laws regulating indoor smoking.127  After its preemption argument 
was rejected by the courts, the bar and restaurant lobby turned to the 
state legislature and lobbied for a law expressly preempting local 
authority to adopt such bans.128  Bowing to the pressure from these 
well-funded interest groups, the state legislature passed such a bill in 
2001, although the law exempted the few preexisting municipal 
bans.129 
The state legislature’s quick preemption of the antismoking 
ordinances, an area into which Oregon municipalities were just 
beginning to tread, almost certainly halted the spread of Corvallis-
type ordinances to other cities and counties in the state, including 
populous Portland and Multnomah County.  Although the state 
legislature eventually passed a statewide comprehensive smoking ban 
that took effect in 2009,130 the legislature’s express preemption 
ensured that Portland, which has been hailed as one of the most 
“health-conscious” cities in America,131 would lag behind other major 
American cities by years in requiring smoke-free workplaces.  Given 
the serious health risks associated with exposure to indoor second-
hand smoke, and the likelihood that more Oregon cities would have 
adopted smoking bans in the absence of the 2001 state law, the state’s 
express preemption of the field for almost eight years likely caused 
serious, preventable harm to thousands of Oregonians.132 
 
126 See Dave Hogan & Ryan Kost, Smoking Has Left the Building, OREGONIAN, June 
16, 2007, at A1. 
127 Or. Rest. Ass’n, 166 Or. App. at 508, 999 P.2d at 519. 
128 Panel OKs Bill to Prohibit Outlawing Smoking in Bars, OREGONIAN, Apr. 17, 2001, 
at B7. 
129 OR. REV. STAT. § 433.863 (2003). 
130 2007 Or. Laws Ch. 602.  Despite passing the ban in June 2007, the state legislature 
allowed bars and restaurants an eighteen-month compliance period before the law took 
effect on January 1, 2009.  Id. § 13.  This eighteen-month delay in the smoking ban’s 
implementation was much longer than implementation delays for similar laws in other 
jurisdictions.  In Washington, for instance, the statewide smoking ban adopted by initiative 
took effect within a mere thirty days.  See Julie Davidow, Smoking Ban Sails to Victory, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 9, 2005, at A18. 
131 Angie Chuang, Portland Second on List of Healthy Cities, OREGONIAN, Jan. 4, 
2007, In Portland, at 3 (noting that a national magazine, Cooking Light, had rated Portland 
the second-healthiest city in America). 
132 The harms from second-hand smoke are well documented, and the level of harmful 
air particles in bars that allow smoking is generally much higher than in those that do not.  
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The smoking ban is just one recent example of the Oregon 
legislature preempting a field in which it was possible—in some 
cases, highly probable—that cities and counties might enact more 
stringent regulation, spurring the interest groups opposed to such 
regulation to seek relief from the statehouse.  Other areas in which the 
state legislature has significantly limited local authority include: rent 
control,133 condominium conversion restrictions,134 minimum 
wage,135 bans on talking on a cell phone while driving,136 mobile-
home closure restrictions,137 and impact fees on new development.138  
In addition, the voters have approved statewide initiatives aimed at 
depriving local governments of authority to regulate in particular 
areas, such as Measure 36 in 2004, which was placed on the ballot in 
 
See Associated Press, Smoking Ban Leads to Big Drop in Heart Attacks, Dec. 31, 2008, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28450513 (discussing the three-year study of 
the smoking ban in Pueblo, Colorado, which concluded that the ban led to a “dramatic 
drop in heart attack hospitalizations”) (discussing RN Alsever et al., Reduced 
Hospitalizations for Acute Myocardial Infarction after Implementation of a Smoke-Free 
Ordinance, City of Pueblo, Colorado, 2002–2006, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP. 1373 (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtml/mm5751a1.htm); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH 
CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL ch. 1, at 11–12 (2006) (concluding that second-hand smoke causes 
“premature death,” “immediate adverse effects on the cardiovascular system,” “coronary 
heart disease and lung cancer,” and “that there is no risk-free level of exposure to 
secondhand smoke”); see also Richard Pérez-Peña, So a Guy Walks Into a Bar With an Air 
Monitor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at N35 (discussing study finding that atmosphere in 
smoke-free bars has “less than one-tenth as many fine particles and other harmful 
chemicals as in cities where smoking is still allowed”). 
133 OR. REV. STAT. § 91.225 (2007). 
134 Infra note 145. 
135 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.017 (2007) (enacted in 2001 to prevent local municipalities 
from adopting minimum wages for private employers—“living wage” ordinances—higher 
than the level set by state law).  See Legis. Admin. Committee Services, 2001 SUMMARY 
OF MAJOR LEGISLATION, at 7, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/comm/ 
commsrvs/2001sml.pdf (discussing HB 2744); see also Jeff Mapes, House Curbs Local 
Wage Rules, OREGONIAN, June 21, 2001, at B1 (describing bill prohibiting local 
governments from enacting a higher minimum wage as “sought by the Oregon Restaurant 
Association,” “a big contributor to Republicans,” who controlled the legislature at that 
time). 
136 OR. REV. STAT. § 801.038 (2007). 
137 OR. REV. STAT. § 90.660 (2007). 
138 Oregon allows municipalities to impose impact fees—called “system development 
charges,” or SDCs—only for the portion of capital (but not operating) expenditures 
attributable to new development.  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 223.297–223.314 (2007).  Moreover, 
Oregon law allows cities and other local districts to impose SDCs for water, transportation, 
parks, OR. REV. STAT. § 223.299—and, since 2007, schools (for which the equivalent of 
SDCs are called “construction taxes”), see 2007 Or. Laws ch. 829, codified in OR. REV. 
STAT. § 320.170–189 (2007)—but not for library services, fire protection, or police costs. 
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reaction to Multnomah County’s attempt to recognize gay 
marriage.139 
The interest groups pushing for express preemption provisions are 
often well-funded and well-organized, such as the restaurant industry 
that lobbied for the smoking ban and minimum wage preemption 
provisions and the public-sector labor unions that lobbied for the law 
upheld in City of La Grande.  Such groups’ lobbying clout is often 
bolstered by their large campaign contributions, particularly given the 
laissez-faire approach to campaign finance that the Oregon Supreme 
Court has consistently stated is required by the Oregon 
Constitution.140  Moreover, Oregon’s relatively lax ethics laws, which 
allow the state’s part-time and poorly paid legislators to use campaign 
contributions to pay a wide variety of expenses associated with 
holding office, may make the legislature particularly susceptible to 
influence by generous interest groups.141 
Interests groups favoring local autonomy on a particular issue are 
sometimes less well-funded, and, on occasion, view local autonomy 
as a readily expendable bargaining chip in the pursuit of larger goals.  
For instance, in the recent campaign to increase protections for renters 
in buildings being converted to condominiums, affordable housing 
activists initially planned to lobby Portland to improve its protection 
of tenants.142  To facilitate this effort, they planned to lobby the state 
legislature to clarify that Oregon cities had the authority to legislate in 
the area of condominium conversions.143  Indeed, the initial version 
 
139 OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (adopted by voter initiative in November 2004).  Although 
the text of Measure 36 does not expressly preempt local governments, the Oregon 
Supreme Court interpreted the measure as intending to do so.  Li v. State, 338 Or. 376, 
389, 110 P.3d 91, 98 (2005). 
140 E.g., Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or. 514, 931 P.2d 770 (1997); see also OREGON 
LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON GOVERNMENT ETHICS 7 (2007), available at 
http://legacy.lclark.edu/faculty/gchaimov/objects/OLC_07_Ethics_Report.pdf. 
141 OREGON LAW COMMISSION, supra note 140, at 7 (noting the “unequal access to 
political decision-makers that large campaign contributors may provide”). 
142 Nick Budnick, Renters Find Laws Don’t Protect Them, PORTLAND TRIB., Dec. 12, 
2006, at A1; see generally Lori Tobias, Condo Conversions Put Renters in Bind, 
OREGONIAN, Mar. 11, 2007, at C1; Erin Hoover Barnett, Renter Roulette, OREGONIAN, 
Aug. 23, 2007, at A10. 
143 Affordable housing advocates felt that such a nonpreemption provision was 
necessary in light of a decision from Clackamas County Circuit court striking down 
Wilsonville’s mobile-home ordinance on preemption grounds, Thunderbird Mobile Home 
LLC v. Wilsonville, no. cv-05-110027, slip op. (Clack. Cty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2007); see 
also Budnick, supra note 142.  This decision is highly questionable in light of Oregon’s 
strong presumption against implied preemption on the civil side.  See supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
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of the bill that later passed during the 2007 session included a 
provision expressly allowing local governments to enact 
condominium conversion requirements more stringent than state 
law.144  In the course of the horse trading necessary to produce a final 
bill that included minor improvements in protections for renters 
statewide, affordable housing activists traded their express permission 
provision for a statute that, with narrow exceptions, preempted local 
authorities from legislating in the area of condominium 
conversions.145  While affordable housing activists may have viewed 
this as a necessary and worthwhile sacrifice to improve conditions 
statewide, it will block Portland and other cities in Oregon from 
serving as potential proving grounds for more tenant-protective 
condominium conversion policies in the future.146 
Like the affordable housing advocates seeking condominium-
conversion legislation, other interest groups may undervalue local 
autonomy when they sacrifice it to obtain a statewide compromise on 
a particular issue.  When pitted against organized and well-funded 
interest groups like business associations or labor unions, Oregon 
cities and counties likely have relatively weak lobbying clout.147  
They do not make campaign contributions to candidates for state 
office.  While a few individual cities, as well as groups like the 
Oregon League of Cities, hire lobbyists to represent them in Salem, 
these lobbyists likely have less clout than those lobbying on behalf of 
groups actively and generously contributing to campaigns.  Efforts to 
reform Oregon’s ethics and campaign finance laws, therefore, may 
help level the playing field somewhat for Oregon’s cities and counties 
in lobbying to retain local authority, as well as for the interest groups 
that want to preserve local authority on particular issues. 
 
144 HB 3186, § 7, available at http://www.stoel.com/webfiles/hb3186.intro.pdf (last 
visited June 3, 2009) (initial version of bill). 
145 See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 91.225, 100.305, 100.315 (2007). 
146 Residents in Seaside, for instance, have expressed concern about condominium 
conversions displacing affordable housing.  See Tobias, supra note 142. 
147 When not pitted against well-funded interest groups, Oregon’s cities and counties 
may enjoy more lobbying clout.  For instance, it is likely Oregon cities have more 
lobbying clout than interest groups representing individual criminal defendants.  See supra 
Part II.  In a separate context, Oregon cities have recently demonstrated some lobbying 
clout in their efforts to press the 2009 legislature to revise the ethics disclosure legislation 
passed in 2007.  See Janie Har, Oregon Legislators Consider Changes to Ethics Laws, 
OREGONIAN, Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2009/03/oregon_legislators_consider_ch.html. 
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The frequency with which local autonomy is bargained away in the 
legislative process suggests that the  “political safeguards” that 
arguably protect state governments from the federal may not protect 
local governments in Oregon from state interference.148  State 
legislators represent districts that do not necessarily conform to 
municipal boundaries.  The governor is elected by a straight popular 
vote, rather than by an electoral college composed of representatives 
of cities or counties.149  In a battle over any particular substantive 
issue, legislators and voters likely consider local authority an abstract 
and tangential matter. 
Despite the state constitution’s seemingly broad recognition of 
home rule, the instances of express preemption doubtless have limited 
the range of subjects in which Oregon’s cities and counties might 
serve as proving grounds.  It is possible that the legislature’s 
propensity to preempt has undercut the confidence of Oregon cities 
and counties to innovate in areas not yet preempted.  In other words, 
perhaps the threat of express preemption looms so large over cities 
and counties that they fear if they push the envelope too far, they will 
provoke a preemption backlash from the state legislature or the 
voters.150  While speculative and difficult to measure, this 
apprehension may be one reason why Oregon’s cities and counties are 
not often at the forefront of local policy change.151 
From the standpoint of local autonomy, would Oregon cities have 
been better off had City of La Grande come out the other way?  Not 
necessarily.  Indeed, the imperio-like system embraced by the City of 
La Grande dissent may have constricted local authority more.  The 
common criticism of the old imperio regimes was that they limited 
local authority to an often narrow realm determined by the 
judiciary.152  Outside of this realm, cities and counties were 
powerless to act.  Such an approach could result in judicial 
invalidation of new local policies by interest groups opposed to them 
 
148 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954). 
149 Id. at 553–58. 
150 Cf. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 90, at 35 (“In thinking about innovative policy 
responses to new conditions or problems, it will be the rare local official that will not be 
concerned about the possibility that their [sic] preferred course of action will run into legal 
problems . . . because of [preemption].”). 
151 Id. at 70. 
152 Sandalow, supra note 97, at 661 nn.77–79. 
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even before they have a chance to go into effect, rather than the 
possibility of eventual legislative preemption in a City of La Grande 
regime.  On the other hand, if, under a system like that pressed by the 
City of La Grande dissent, Oregon courts were to define municipal 
authority broadly, perhaps there would be more local policy 
innovation in substantive areas.153  Indeed, perhaps one reason 
Portland embarked on its bold, and controversial, experiment of 
offering public financing for city campaigns154 is a belief that the 
program could not constitutionally be preempted by state law, as per 
City of La Grande, because it concerns the structures and procedures 
of the city’s government. 
While the assessment from the perspective of local innovation 
might be inconclusive, jurisprudential concerns counsel against 
reconsidering City of La Grande.  Asking courts to place a certain 
subject matter in a local or statewide box is a categorical exercise that 
smacks of legal formalism.155  It is rarely self-evident whether a 
particular policy concern—say, banning smoking or prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—is a local or 
statewide matter.  Requiring courts to make this judgment is, as 
Justice Linde stated in City of La Grande, asking them to make a 
judgment that is often of a “political” nature.156  Although at least one 
prominent scholar has defended the legitimacy of this judicial role,157 
most states moved away from this view decades ago.158 
To be sure, City of La Grande does not completely eliminate the 
courts’ role in deciding questions of state-local power distribution.  
Oregon courts must decide claims of express and implied preemption 
as well as whether certain ordinances and laws concern the structures 
and procedures or form of local government (in which the state may 
not legislate, at least without a compelling interest); these categorical 
determinations are also prone to the critique of being overly 
 
153 City of La Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 157, 576 P.2d 1204, 
1215 (1978) (Tongue, J., dissenting), aff’d on reh’g, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978). 
154 See generally CITY OF PORTLAND, OREGON, PUBLICLY FINANCED CAMPAIGNS IN 
PORTLAND (March 2005), http://www.portlandonline.com/Auditor/Index.cfm? 
c=37740&a=80234. 
155 See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). 
156 City of La Grande, 281 Or. at 157, 576 P.2d at 1215. 
157 See Sandalow, supra note 97. 
158 David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 391–
92 (2001). 
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formalistic.159  Nevertheless, City of La Grande frees the Oregon 
courts from having to decide whether a wide range of substantive 
social and economic policy would be better regulated at the state or 
local level.  Reading the Home Rule Amendment as establishing an 
imperio home-rule regime in which ordinances on local matters are 
protected from legislative preemption would be a clumsy method by 
which to prevent the loss of local autonomy that has occurred through 
legislative preemption. 
B.  Revenue Sources 
In addition to the threat of express preemption, local governments, 
as well as school districts,160 in Oregon have seen their available 
sources of revenue restricted in recent years.  A trio of statewide 
initiatives passed in the 1990s, Measures 5 (1990), 47 (1996), and 50 
(1997), imposed constitutional and statutory caps on local property 
taxes.161  While the details are complicated and have been discussed 
thoroughly elsewhere,162 Oregon’s “property tax revolt” shifted much 
of the burden for funding education from local school districts to the 
state.163  The kinds of services funded by general-service local 
governments—police, fire, parks, libraries, and, in some cases, public 
 
159 See City of La Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd. (City of La Grande II), 284 Or. 
173, 186, 586 P.2d 765, 779 (1978) (Tongue, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s 
“‘procedure-substance’ dichotomy” as “an exercise in semantics”). 
160 Oregon recognizes school districts as separate “bodies corporate” from the cities or 
counties they serve.  OR. REV. STAT. § 332.072 (2007). 
161 Measure 5 became article XI, section 11b of the Oregon Constitution.  Because the 
1997 legislature found Measure 47 unworkable, it referred replacement Measure 50 to the 
people, who passed it in 1997 as article XI, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution.  Waldo 
Block Partners v. Dep’t of Revenue, 16 Or. Tax. 33, 36, 2002 WL 759633, *3 (2002).  See 
David H. Angeli, The Oregon Legislature’s Constitutional Obligation to Provide an 
Adequate System of Public Education: Moving from Bold Rhetoric to Effective Action, 42 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 489, 493 (2006). 
162 See Angeli, supra note 161, at 493–95; see also OREGON DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE, HOW MEASURE 50 CHANGED THE PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM (1998), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/STATS/docs/303-405-98/pg6-11.pdf [hereinafter DOR 
REPORT]. 
163  Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 345 Or. 596, 609, 200 P.3d 133, 141 (2009); see 
also Cindy Hunt, Senate Bill 100: Creating Public School Choice Through Charter 
Schools, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 265, 298 n.203 (2000).  Article VIII, section 8 of the 
Oregon Constitution requires that the state legislature appropriate money for education 
sufficient to meet “quality goals established by law.”  OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (2008).  
The Oregon Supreme Court recently ruled, however, that this provision does not authorize 
the courts to award an injunction requiring the legislature to allocate funds.  Pendleton 
School Dist. 16R, 345 Or. at 609, 200 P.3d at 141. 
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transportation—have also been constrained by Measures 5 and 50.  
Even after Measure 50, however, Oregon’s cities and counties have 
retained some ability to increase property taxes to pay for local 
services under a “local option levy.”164  Since 1997, cities, counties, 
and other local service districts have used this tool a number of times 
to fund local services.165  By requiring a majority vote of a majority 
of registered voters, however, the local option has proved a more 
difficult way of raising revenue for local governments than the pre-
Measure 5 system.166  In November 2008, Oregon voters repealed the 
“double majority” requirement of Measure 47, which may make it 
easier for local governments to raise revenue in the future.167 
The limitations imposed by Measures 5 and 50 have likely 
prevented cities and counties in Oregon from adopting or even 
considering new policies that come with a higher price tag.  For this 
reason, one might see these measures as undercutting local authority.  
On the other hand, although the measures have imposed substantial 
limits on the traditional method of raising local revenue, cities and 
counties retain other methods for raising revenue, such as imposing a 
general sales tax,168 a gasoline tax,169 or an income tax,170 that are 
not subject to the same requirements as local option levies.  While 
competitive pressures may make it more difficult for Oregon 
communities to sustain sales or income taxes than higher property 
 
164 See DOR REPORT, supra note 162, at 8. 
165 Id. 
166 Prior to Measure 5, local governments could raise property taxes by up to six percent 
annually without the voters’ authorization.  Id. at 1.  For an example of the efforts to which 
local governments must now resort to persuade voters to approve tax increases, see Marion 
County Voter Pamphlet, Special Election, Measure 24-09, Arguments in Favor, Sept. 15, 
1998, available at http://apps.co.marion.or.us/co/elections/votepamp/vpsep98/a24 
_09a.asp. 
167 See Oregon Ballot Measure 56 (2008). 
168 Ashland has a five-percent sales tax on prepared food and beverages, but it is the 
only city in Oregon with anything close to a retail sales tax.  See City of Ashland, Food 
and Beverage Tax, available at http://www.ashland.or.us/Page.asp?NavID=9180 (last 
visited May 6, 2009). 
169 The Tigard City Council, for example, approved a three-cent gasoline tax in 2007.  
See Barbara Sherman, Tigard Gas Tax Revenues Sputter, TIMES (Tigard), Jan. 10, 2008, at 
A16. 
170 Although Multnomah County voters approved a three-year income tax levy in 2003, 
see Multnomah County Measure No. 26-48 (2003); Sam Dillon, Portland Voters Approve 
Oregon’s Only County Income Tax, Aiding Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A16, a 
local income tax does not necessarily require voter approval in Oregon. 
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taxes,171 few Oregon municipalities have attempted to use such 
methods to raise revenue since 1997.  Perhaps some local 
governments have retained adequate funding—or even increased 
funding—for programs since 1997 through local option levies.  But in 
other circumstances, local officials have apparently chosen to accept a 
cut in revenues—and, therefore, services—rather than seek a new 
revenue source that they fear will be politically unpopular.  This 
choice may reflect some failure of local officials to adequately 
represent their constituents’ tax-service preferences.  Alternatively, 
many Oregonians may simply prefer lower local expenditures and 
lower taxes to higher expenditures funded some other way.172  Hence, 
Oregonians may be content that Oregon cities are not leading the 
nation in adopting trendsetting local policies that come with a hefty 
price tag. 
C.  Demographic and Political Factors 
A final reason why Oregon’s cities and counties are not at the 
vanguard of local policy innovation is fairly simple: Oregon is not a 
particularly populous state,173 and it has only one city—Portland—
among the most populous cities in America, and only thirtieth at 
that.174  Besides Portland, with approximately 550,000 people, only 
two other Oregon cities—Salem and Eugene—comprise more than 
100,000 persons.175  It is America’s largest cities that generally lead 
the nation in adopting new and noteworthy policies that percolate out  
to other cities and up to the state level.  New York City, for instance, 
America’s most populous city, first enacted a trans fat ban, and was 
the first local government to require franchise restaurants to post 
 
171 Cf. Julie M. Cheslik et al., The Supreme Court Report 2005–06, 38 URB. LAW. 737, 
788 (2006) (discussing “race to the bottom” in taxation among competing governmental 
entities). 
172 Those residents with divergent preferences might “vote with their feet” and leave 
low tax, low revenue cities or Oregon altogether.  See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory 
of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
173 As of 2007, Oregon ranked twenty-seventh out of fifty states.  See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, 
REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/ 
states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited May 6, 2009). 
174 Top Fifty Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank, http://www.infoplease.com/ 
ipa/A0763098.html (as of 2005) (last visited May 6, 2009). 
175 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OREGON POPULATION ESTIMATES (as of 2007), 
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41000lk.html (click “Population 
Estimates: Places in Oregon Listed Alphabetically”).  Gresham is close, with 99,000 
residents, and both Beaverton and Hillsboro have more than 90,000.  Id. 
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calorie counts on their menus.176  Los Angeles, the country’s second 
most populous city, recently became the first city to adopt a 
moratorium on fast-food restaurants in certain areas in an effort to 
combat obesity.177  San Francisco, fourteenth in population, has in 
recent years enacted a number of “firsts”: requiring city contractors to 
provide domestic partnership benefits to gay employees,178 
attempting to provide health care to all city residents,179 and banning 
plastic bags provided by retailers.180 
While some “firsts” have emanated from smaller cities and 
towns,181 there are institutional reasons why larger cities tend to use 
their home-rule powers more aggressively.  In contrast to towns and 
smaller cities, larger cities usually have full-time, salaried mayors and 
council members, as well as a much larger and a better compensated 
corps of civil servants.182  Large cities often also have larger city 
councils that function like mini-state legislatures, with specialized 
committees and professional staff.183  Populous municipalities have 
large staffs of city attorneys with specialized knowledge in state and 
local government law who advise elected officials on the legality of 
 
176 Thomas J. Lueck & Kim Severson, New York Bans Most Trans Fats in Restaurants, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1; N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 
F. Supp. 2d 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
177 Molly Hennessy-Fiske & David Zahniser, Council Bans New Fast-Food Outlets, 
L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at B1. 
178 See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12B, § 12B.1 (effective 
June 1, 1997); see also SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE EQUAL 
BENEFITS ORDINANCE:  A SIX-MONTH REPORT (1998). 
179 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 14.3(a) (“San Francisco Health 
Security Ordinance of 2006”); see also Golden Gate Rest. Assoc. v. San Francisco, 512 
F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding ordinance against ERISA challenge). 
180 Plastic Bag Reduction Ordinance, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
§§ 1701–09; Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Board Votes to Ban Some Plastic Bags, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007, at A16. 
181 San Luis Obispo, California, for instance, was the first city to adopt a 
comprehensive indoor smoking ban.  Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth 
Century 1950–1999—The Battle Is Joined, available at http://www.tobacco.org/ 
resources/history/Tobacco_History20-2.html (last visited May 6, 2009). 
182 New York City, for instance, employs more than 300,000 people at more than 
seventy agencies.  See City of New York, Working for NYC, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.62e273bb0ef1f307a62fa24601c789a0 
(last visited May 6, 2009). 
183 The average number of city councilmen in America’s top ten cities is just under 
twenty, see Diller, supra note 1, at 1138 n.113, whereas the average council membership 
for all cities nationwide is seven, id. 
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new policies and represent them in court when sued.184  The larger 
cities’ legal offices are often considered prestigious places of 
employment doing interesting work, thereby attracting some of the 
best and brightest legal minds.185 
In Oregon, full-time, salaried elected officials lead few cities or 
counties.  Portland has a full-time mayor and city council 
(“commission”), although its council consists of only four other 
elected commissioners.  Portland’s five-person council stands in 
contrast to city councils of fifty-one in New York City and eight and 
thirteen, respectively, in similar-sized Oklahoma City and Denver.186  
A handful of Oregon counties, such as Multnomah and Lane, have a 
slate of five full-time, salaried commissioners.187  Otherwise, part-
time volunteers largely govern Oregon’s cities and counties.  Many 
Oregon cities, including its second, third, and fourth most populous—
Salem, Eugene, and Gresham—operate under a city manager form of 
government in which the citizens elect volunteer or part-time mayors 
and councilors to set policy for the city,188 but appoint a professional 
city manager to supervise the city’s government.189  The city-
manager form of government stresses technical competence in the 
provision of bread-and-butter services and, not surprisingly, de-
 
184 The New York City Law Department, for instance, has 690 lawyers and seventeen 
legal divisions.  See New York City Law Dept., About the Law Dept., http://www.nyc 
.gov/ html/law/html/about/about.shtml (last visited June 2, 2009). 
185 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Recruiting City Attorneys Despite Necessary Salary 
Limitations, 234 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2005) (explaining New York City Law Department’s success 
at recruiting lawyers with impressive credentials). 
186 See PORTLAND, OR. CHARTER, art. I, § 2-102, http://www.portlandonline.com/ 
Auditor/index.cfm?c=28237&a=13468 (last visited June 18, 2009); Diller, supra note 1, at 
1138 n.113. 
187 E.g., MULTNOMAH COUNTY CHARTER § 3.10, http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/ 
counsel/charter.shtml#_Toc145994935 (last visited June 18, 2009). 
188 SALEM, OR. CHARTER ch. VI, § 26, http://www.cityofsalem.net/Departments/ 
Legal/Pages/CityCharter.aspx#section6 (last visited June 18, 2009); EUGENE, OR. 
CHARTER ch. VI, sec. 18; GRESHAM, OR. CHARTER ch. III, § 10, 
http://greshamoregon.gov/city/city-departments/city-attorneys-office/city-charter/ (last 
visited June 18, 2009) (Eugene pays its city councilors a “stipend” of $1000 per month and 
its mayor a “stipend” of $1500 per month, while Gresham pays only its appointed 
officials). 
189 SALEM, OR. CHARTER ch. V, § 23, http://www.cityofsalem.net/Departments/ 
Legal/Pages/CityCharter.aspx#section5 (last visited June 18, 2009); EUGENE, OR. 
CHARTER ch. IV, § 16; GRESHAM, OR. CHARTER ch. V, sec. 20, 
http://greshamoregon.gov/city/city-departments/city-attorneys-office/city-charter/ (last 
visited June 18, 2009). 
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emphasizes politically risky policymaking at the local level.190  This 
is not to say that Oregon’s cities need more salaried officials, but it is 
likely a significant reason why Oregon cities are rarely at the 
forefront of municipal policymaking nationwide. 
Another likely reason why many of the most newsworthy policies 
have emerged from America’s most populous cities is the 
concentration of political preferences in those cities.  Large cities lean 
disproportionately to the left in their politics, at least as measured by 
voting in national elections and levels of party identification.191  This 
political concentration plays a role in cities adopting policies that 
statehouses and the federal government, which represent a broader, 
more politically diverse electorate, might be hesitant to embrace.  In 
Oregon, Portland and Multnomah County have a concentrated, 
heavily Democratic electorate,192 yet both have hesitated to embrace 
newsworthy policies that other cities or counties with similar political 
profiles have recently enacted.  For instance, since 2007, a number of 
cities around the country, following San Francisco’s lead, have either 
banned or taxed retail stores’ use of plastic bags in an effort to combat 
pollution and global warming.193  After considering the issue 
publicly, the Portland City Council declined to take action on the 
issue.194  Likewise, after New York City and some other local 
governments adopted trans fat bans, Multnomah County 
Commissioners considered enacting a similar proposal, but ultimately 
backed off after a wave of hyperbolic opposition.195  Although the 
 
190 One recent exception was Gresham’s adoption of the first rental housing inspection 
program in the state.  See Robin Franzen, Cracking Down on Substandard Rentals, 
OREGONIAN, Dec. 18, 2008, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
portland/index.ssf/2008/12/cracking_down_on_substandard_r.html; Editorial, A City, and 
a Mayor, on the Move, OREGONIAN, Dec. 26, 2007, at B3. 
191 John Nichols, Urban Archipelago, NATION, June 2005, at 13. 
192 In 2004, for instance, John Kerry defeated George W. Bush by a margin of 72% to 
27% in Multnomah County, November 2, 2004 General Election Results, 
http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dbcs/elections/2004-11/results.shtml, and in 2008, Barack 
Obama defeated John McCain by a margin of 77% to 21%, November 4, 2008 General 
Election Results, http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/ dbcs/elections/2008-11/results.shtml 
(last visited May 6, 2009). 
193 Jennifer Steinhauer, In San Francisco, Subtle Variations in Voters’ Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A19. 
194 James Mayer, Adams Puts Grocery Bag Tax Idea on Hold: Citing the Bad Economy, 
the Portland Mayor Shelves His Plan, OREGONIAN, Feb. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/news/123371971015600.xml
&coll=7. 
195 E.g., Brittany Schaeffer, No Fries for You!, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Oct. 25, 2006, at 
18. 
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state legislature preempted municipalities’ authority to enact 
comprehensive smoking bans in 2001, Portland and Multnomah 
County might have been exempted from the preemption had they—
like Corvallis, Eugene, Philomath, and many other cities and counties 
around the country—enacted a ban before then.  
To be sure, Portland and Multnomah County have engaged in some 
policy innovation of note in recent years.  Portland has established a 
controversial day laborer center for immigrant workers,196 adopted a 
system of public financing for municipal elections,197 become the 
first city in the nation to establish a noncontiguous urban renewal 
district,198 and gained national notoriety by opting out of cooperation 
with the FBI’s antiterrorism task force.199  Moreover, Portland 
engaged in a prominent, fifteen-year policy experiment—the now-
defunct exclusion zones for prostitution and drug offenders—that 
could hardly be described as politically liberal.200  For its part, 
Multnomah County was one of a handful of local governments around 
the nation that sought—albeit unsuccessfully—to recognize gay 
marriage.201  Recently, the county followed New York City’s lead 
and adopted an ordinance requiring franchise restaurants to publicly 
post calorie counts.202  The mix of policies put forward by Portland 
and Multnomah County may simply reflect residents’ preferences for 
certain policies over others.  Indeed, one explanation for some of the 
resistance in Portland and Multnomah County to policies embraced 
by other politically liberal local governments—such as banning trans 
fats or taxing plastic bags—might be Oregon’s vaunted 
 
196 Anna Griffin, Day Labor Center Opens, but Few Jobs to Be Had, OREGONIAN, June 
17, 2008, at A1. 
197 PUBLICLY FINANCED CAMPAIGNS IN PORTLAND, supra note 154. 
198 See Friends of Urban Renewal v. Portland, LUBA No. 2008-116, Jan. 2, 2009, 
available at http://oregon.gov/LUBA/docs/Opinions/2009/01-09/08116.pdf. 
199 Anna Griffin, Joy in Galley as Portland Quits FBI Task Force, OREGONIAN, Apr. 
29, 2005, at A1. 
200 See State v. Lhasawa, 334 Or. 543, 55 P.3d 477 (2002) (discussing Portland 
ordinances establishing exclusion zones); see also Andy Dworkin, Expiring Drug-Free 
Zones End a City Era, OREGONIAN, Sept. 29, 2007, at B1 (describing end of Portland’s 
“15-year experiment”). 
201 See Li v. State, 338 Or. 376, 110 P.3d 91 (2005). 
202 Arthur Gregg Sulzberger, County Requires Calories on Menu, OREGONIAN, Aug. 1, 
2008, at A1. 
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libertarianism, which runs deep even in otherwise politically liberal 
areas.203   
On the other hand, the threat of express preemption remains a 
threat to Portland’s and Multnomah County’s efforts to adopt 
innovative local policies.  The state’s voters expressly preempted 
Multnomah County’s gay marriage policy by passing Measure 36 in 
2004.  Whether the legislature will overrule Portland’s satellite urban 
renewal district remains to be seen.204  Just before this Article’s 
printing, the state legislature passed a menu-labeling bill that largely 
mimicked Multnomah County’s substantive approach to the subject, 
although the state law would not take effect until 2011,205 whereas the 
Multnomah County ordinance was to be implemented by the end of 
2009.206  The state bill preempts all local laws on the subject, thereby 
delaying the implementation of a menu-labeling requirement in the 
Oregon’s most populous county for more than a year.207  
 
CONCLUSION 
After 103 years, home rule in Oregon is a qualified success.  
Oregon’s cities enjoy a broad amount of power to regulate in 
substantive areas, at least through civil enforcement mechanisms, and 
virtually unfettered power to control their own forms of government.  
Oregon’s cities’ authority to regulate criminally is appropriately 
limited, although the judicial doctrine in this area is in need of 
clarification.  Further, the state legislature has been quick to intervene 
and preempt cities’ authority to address social problems in new and 
innovative ways.  This propensity for express preemption has carved 
out a number of substantive social and regulatory areas in which cities 
may not tread, thereby stunting policy innovation by local 
governments throughout the state.  A greater respect for the value of 
cities as policy proving grounds by the state’s legislators and its 
 
203 See, e.g., IAN DOWBIGGIN, A MERCIFUL END: THE EUTHANASIA MOVEMENT IN 
MODERN AMERICA 171 (Oxford University Press 2003) (discussing Oregon’s “culture of 
libertarianism”). 
204 At the time of printing, some state legislators had proposed a bill that would allow 
cities to create limited noncontiguous urban renewal districts.  See S.B. 744, 75th Or. 
Legis. Ass’y (2009 Sess.). 
205 See H.B. 2726, 75th Or. Legis. Ass’y (May 1, 2009); Bill Graves, Oregon Attacks 
Menu Fat, OREGONIAN, June 2, 2009, a A1. 
206 Multnomah County Health Dept., Chronic Disease Prevention Program, 
http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/health/chronic/labeling.shtml (last visited June 11, 2009). 
207 Id. 
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voters is necessary before the promise of home rule in Oregon can be 
more completely fulfilled. 
 
 
